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Mental Age 
Mental Illness, Models of. Although the concept 
of mental illness is central to the field of mental 
health and the practice of counseling, there is con-
tinuing disagreement about its definition. Several 
views are widely held. Each has important impli-
cations for understanding mental illness, deter-
mining which conditions are disorders and who 
has them, and choosing appropriate approaches to 
treatment. This controversy involves several im-
portant issues. 
In a recent review, Wakefield (1992) presents a 
summary of the different approaches to defining 
mental illness. They include the views that mental 
disorder is a myth, purely a value concept, what-
ever professionals treat, statistical deviance, dis-
advantage, unexpectable distress or disability, or 
harmful dysfunction. Wakefield prefers the harm-
ful dysfunction approach, which he believes is es-
sentially identical with common conceptions of 
physical illness. Several of Wakefield's major points 
are summarized. 
Psychiatrist Thomas Szasz contends that men-
tal illness is a myth. Central to the illness model is 
the notion that biological lesions and disorders go 
together. However, physical lesions are possible 
without constituting a disorder (e.g., albinism, 
webbed toes), and disorders may occur without a 
known lesion (e.g., trigeminal neuralgia, senile pru-
ritus) . Szasz believes a few mental disorders are 
based on biological causes. The rest, he contends, 
are merely evaluative labels that legitimize social 
sanctions and change efforts directed at persons 
who do not behave in socially approved ways . Ex-
amples include labeling homosexuals, runaway 
slaves (drapetomania), and social dissidents men-
tally disordered. Demonstrating abuses, however, 
does not establish that mental disorder is a myth. 
Evidence that schizophrenia occurs widely across 
cultures strains the claim that mental disorder is 
purely a value concept. 
Limiting mental disorder to that which profes-
sionals treat also has problems. It implies that with-
out treatment one does not have a disorder. Con-
versely, seeking treatment only to discover that one 
is normal becomes impossible under this criterion. 
Statistical deviance likewise fails. One can be de-
viant in both positive and negative ways, yet the sta-
tistical approach treats these as equally disordered. 
Also, some disorders, such as high blood pressure, 
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are statistically common. Statistical rareness is thus 
inadequate. Defining disorder as negative deviation 
helps-but it introduces values. Further, crimes, dis-
courtesy, and moral transgressions, while undesir-
able, are not considered disorders . 
Biological disadvantage, an evolutionary con-
cept, labels as disorders those conditions that im-
pair fertility or speed mortality, thus threatening 
species survival. However, many disorders appear 
to have neither of these consequences. 
The American Psychiatric Association's Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), or DSM-
rv, is based on the notion of unexpectable distress 
or disability. Although harmful dysfunction pro-
vides the conceptual foundation, the criteria for 
specific disorders are based on distress or disabil-
ity and statistical infrequency. The problem is twofold, 
Wakefield points out. First, normal reactions that 
are statistically rare are defined by DSM-IV as dis-
ordered. Second, such unexpected conditions as 
extreme misfortune and ignorance can cause dis-
tress and disability yet are excluded as mental dis-
orders; DSM-IV describes some of these conditions 
under the V codes. 
Wakefield (1992) concludes that harmful dys-
function is the best definition of mental disorder. 
Harmful dysfunction is a hybrid definition: "disor-
der must include a factual component . .. (and) dis-
order requires harm, which involves values" (p. 381 ). 
For Wakefield the factual-scientific component of 
disorder is based on evolutionary biology; that is, 
disorder involves a failure of a human biological 
system to perform its intended function in preserv-
ing the organism. Wakefield infers intended func-
tion from the effects of the system; it need not im-
ply active agency such as that of a creator God. He 
concludes "an evolutionary approach . .. is central 
to an understanding of psychopathology. Dysfunc-
tion is thus a purely factual scientific concept" 
(p . 383 ). In addition, "only dysfunctions that are so-
cially disvalued are disorders" (p. 384 ). A key factor 
is that "it is the nature of the cause of the symptoms, 
and not the nature of the symptoms themselves, that 
determines whether a disorder is mental" (p. 384). 
Central to the concept of mental illness is the 
notion that behavioral disturbances are in some 
sense diseases. Although it is clearly no longer the 
sole model, the disease model, or harmful dys-
function, remains the most widely accepted view. 
The difficulty one faces in attempting to refer to 
these phenomena without using terms connoting 
illness reflects the pervasiveness of the disease/men-
tal illness model. 
Historical Perspective. From antiquity until the 
late nineteenth century persons with deviant be-
havior were considered to be malingerers, a moral 
concern, or to be possessed by spirits, a religious 
concern. Exorcism and torture were used in an ef-
fort to remove the influence of evil spirits. Special 
favor was given to benevolent spirits. 
Treatment of the mentally ill changed markedly 
during the period from the late eighteenth century 
through the time of Sigmund Freud. The humani-
tarian reforms under Phillipe Pinel, Tuke, and 
Dorothea Lynde Dix resulted in modification of asy-
lums. Greisinger and Morel advanced the disease 
hypothesis. John Gray, editor of the American Jour-
nal of Insanity from 1855 to 1885, insisted that phys-
ical lesions produced insanity and led in the trans-
formation of mental asylums into treatment 
facilities. The work of Jean-Martin Charcot, Pierre 
Janet, Bernheim, and Freud led to a conceptual 
shift; persons who had previously been considered 
malingerers were subsequently diagnosed as hys-
terics. Thus the disease model was extended to 
persons outside the institutional care setting. 
Further credence was given to the disease model 
by the dramatic discovery that advanced syphilitic 
infection causes general paresis, a psychotic dis-
order. This hypothesis was first suggested in 185 7; 
positive identification of syphilitic infection as the 
causative agent was provided in 1913. Together 
these movements culminated in a rna jor paradigm 
shift in which the disease notion replaced moral-
religious explanations. 
The view that mental disorders are diseases has 
been widely accepted in the twentieth century. How-
ever, there is considerable conceptual ambiguity 
regarding the nature of the disease or medical 
model. Blaney (1975) suggests four versions: men-
tal disorders are physiologically based diseases; ev-
idences of disorder are manifestations of an un-
derlying condition (not necessarily organic); the 
individual has no responsibility for his or her be-
havior; psychiatric symptoms can be best under-
stood by ordering them into syndromes. 
Alternative Models. A number of alternative 
models have been advanced to replace the medical 
model. Most widely accepted are the various so-
ciopsychological or behavioral models. Sociopsy-
chological models postulate that there is no radi-
cal discontinuity between normal and disturbed 
behavior. The underlying mechanisms of behavior 
are the processes of learning and behavior control. 
Diagnosis is focused on identifying the frequencies, 
topographies, and social or environmental condi-
tions controlling problem behaviors (Kazdin, 1989). 
The systems model locates the problem within 
family and social systems rather than in the indi-
vidual. For example, many contemporary family 
therapists view parent-child problems as problems 
of the system. Neither the parent nor the child is 
identified as a patient who has the problem. Rather, 
the problem arises from the interaction between 
parent and child and may be significantly affected 
by interactions with other family members or cir-
cumstances as well. 
Culture and Mental Disorder. DSM-IV contains 
an appendix that examines culture-related syn-
dromes. Anorexia nervosa and chronic fatigue syn-
drome, disorders that are largely found in the United 
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States and Europe, remain in the main body of the 
DSM, while ataques de nervois, a Latin American 
disorder similar to hysteria, and tajin kyofusho, a 
Japanese disorder similar to social phobia, are rel-
egated to the appendix on culture-related disorders. 
A study of Hopi culture reveals five conditions that 
overlap with the DSM-IV criteria for depression, 
although none fully fit: two conditions are trans-
lated worry sickness, others include unhappiness, 
heartbrokenness, and drunkenlike craziness with 
or without alcohol. 
Two conclusions may be drawn. First, mental 
disorders occur across cultural boundaries. Second, 
the precise form of disorders varies across cultures, 
with some disorders being very different and oth-
ers fairly similar in varied cultures. Stix concludes 
"although some diseases, such as schizophrenia, do 
appear in all cultures, a number of others do not. 
Moreover, the variants of an illness-and the course 
they take-in different cultural settings may diverge 
so dramatically that a physician may as well be treat-
ing separate diseases" (Stix, 1996, p. 16). 
In a recent discussion of culture and mental dis-
orders, Dana noted that there is a tendency to treat 
cultural differences as pathology. He proposed that 
cultural information is essential to reduce egre-
gious misclassification. Dana went on to say, "DSM 
is a very dangerous instrument, and it really is used 
for social control. . .. It lumps together disease 
(medical model) and cultural model etiologies" 
(Dana, 1996). 
Christian Perspective. Since a Christian ap-
proach is particularly concerned with ethical and 
moral issues, the differences between a medical 
and a sociopsychological conceptualization of men-
tal illness have profound implications for a Chris-
tian perspective. In a medical conceptualization 
the alcoholic, the depressive, the psychopathic, the 
retarded, and other disordered individuals are seen 
primarily as victims of processes outside their con-
trol. If the problem is viewed as a behavioral dis-
order, the individual's personal responsibility for 
his or her present condition becomes a prominent 
issue with clear moral implications. In reality the 
issues may be even more complex, since contem-
porary research increasingly shows that personal-
sociallifestyle is a major contributing factor in con-
tracting various physical diseases. 
For many Christians, Wakefield's (1992) appeal 
to evolutionary biology in explaining dysfunction 
is objectionable. However, failure to perform a God-
intended function is a plausible alternative. The 
claim that dysfunction is purely factual fails, since 
science is not possible without making prescien-
tific assumptions, and any interpretation of scien-
tific data inevitably mingles observations and as-
sumptions. In the words of Bevan and Kessel (1994), 
"most often implicit, ideologies are complex, not 
easily broken into elements ... they are like sand 
at a picnic: they get into everything ... to talk of 
scholarship and science as separate from the life 
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experience, the intentions, the values, the world-
view, and social life of the people who create it is 
to deny its fundamental character as a human ac-
tivity" (p. 506). 
While articulate presentations that are sensitive 
to complex issues remain rare, the ramifications of 
these models have not escaped Christian writers. 
At one extreme Adams (1970) emphatically pro-
claims that all problems reflect either organic dis-
order or sin. Other writers recognize that sin and 
organic disorders are only two of many potential 
causes of psychological problems. Some causes in-
clude response to existential issues, maladaptive 
use of defense mechanisms, demonic influence, 
and learning (Cosgrove & Mallory, 1977). 
All mental disorders-indeed, all problems in 
our world-may ultimately be traced to the entry 
of sin into the world and the subsequent disrup-
tion of the created order (cf. Rom. 8: 19-22). Thus 
at one level it is accurate to say that the cause of 
psychological problems is sin. However, viewing 
the problem solely as personal sin is too simplis-
tic. The effects of sin are manifested in mental dis-
orders on at least three different levels: the effects 
of personal sin leading to guilt or anxiety; the ef-
fects of sin in the world, resulting in various bio-
logical disorders such as genetic disorders, en-
docrinological malfunctions, disease, and traumas; 
the effects of the sin of others, such as retardation 
due to neglect or abuse by a parent and anxiety or 
depression following an assault. In addition, we see 
interactions among these factors, such as when a 
person's abuse of alcohol or drugs results in brain 
damage. 
Ethical and moral issues have often been viewed 
as largely irrelevant within the medical model of 
mental illness. However, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that moral issues are significant. The medi-
cal model suggests that individuals should not be 
held responsible for their diseases. But increasing 
evidence that personal habits are a major factor in 
illness underscores the role of personal responsi-
bility for disease. Such habits as use of alcohol, to-
bacco, and drugs; diet; exercise; sleep patterns; and 
sexual promiscuity contribute significantly to risk 
of disease. In addition, compliance with treatment 
has become an increasing source of professional 
concern and research. All of this suggests that the 
distinctions between medical and psychosocial 
viewpoints may not be as clear-cut as the forego-
ing discussion might imply. 
Analogies can be drawn between the various ef-
fects of sin in psychopathology and models of psy-
chopathology. The presence of sin in the world is 
most clearly reflected in the disease model, which 
focuses on the physical basis for disorders. The ef-
fects of personal sin and to some extent the sins of 
others seem consistent with the sociopsychologi-
cal model. Finally, the systems model emphasizes 
phenomena most consistent with problems stem-
ming from the sinfulness of others. 
Conclusions. The medical model has been help-
ful in some respects and has created problems in 
others. However, the complexity and diversity of 
phenomena included in DSM-IV require acknowl-
edgment of multiple causal factors in mental dis-
orders, and therefore the medical model alone is 
inadequate. A comprehensive model of mental func-
tioning must include the following components: bi-
ological factors, including genetic, anatomical, and 
biochemical causes and infectious diseases; psy-
chological factors, including personal, develop-
mental, and family history, and relationships tooth-
ers; social factors such as societal and cultural 
norms and standards; spiritual factors, including 
personal sin, ethical and moral responsibilities, re-
lationship to God, and spiritual growth and devel-
opment. It is doubtful that any existing model is 
able to fully encompass this diversity. 
Medical considerations are essential to a full un-
derstanding of mental disorders, and further ad-
vances will likely be made through the medical ap-
proach. However, the medical model does not 
encompass all of the phenomena included under 
mental illness, and hence other models are required 
as well. Perhaps an integrative model that brings 
together elements from several of the present mod-
els will emerge. Alternatively, a comprehensive new 
system may eventually develop. Such a model 
should reflect the biopsychosocial and spiritual 
complexity of human functioning. 
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See ABNORMAL PsYCHOLOGY. 
Mental Mechanisms. See DEFENSE MECHANISMS. 
Mental Retardation. A condition affecting about 
6.5 million people in the United States, in which the 
individual's general intellectual functioning is sig-
nificantly subaverage, adaptive behavior is impaired, 
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